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Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy 
Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical 
Considerations in an Evolving Environment 
Introduction 
Litigation against directors and officers is ubiquitous in bankruptcy 
courts. Indeed, charges of director malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty are 
leveled at the outset of many bankruptcy cases—whether in the hallways outside of 
first day hearings or creditors committee formation meetings, in early hearings, or 
in pre-petition letter writing campaigns aimed at encouraging or discouraging 
specific board actions. These charges frequently wind their way into litigation, 
typically later in the bankruptcy case.1 
While the bankruptcy field has become accustomed to this practice, it bears 
noting in a Stern v. Marshall2 world that breach of fiduciary duty and deepening 
insolvency are state law concepts, not portions of the Bankruptcy Code.3 However, 
bankruptcy courts try the overwhelming majority of litigation and decide most of 
the reported case law. Thus, director and officer litigation claims have become 
standard “bankruptcy litigation.”4 The reason is fairly straightforward: suits alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty and the like are much more likely to be filed when a 
business strategy has failed, precisely because it has failed (there isn’t much sense in 
challenging an objectively successful outcome),5 and the fact that a company has 
filed a bankruptcy case often means that business strategies can be characterized 
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 1. LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291 (D. Del. 2000). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604 (2011). 
 3. Certain opinions hold that the post-petition conduct of a board is governed by a federal common law 
fiduciary duty. However, charges of post-petition breach of fiduciary duty are rare.  See infra Part III.D. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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(not always accurately) as having failed.6 Moreover, the fact of bankruptcy means 
that a fiduciary, such as a Chapter 11 or 7 trustee, a creditors committee, or a post-
plan confirmation trust set up to pursue litigation claims, typically will be 
appointed, thereby avoiding the “collective action” problem outside of bankruptcy.7 
And the bankruptcy process itself often makes funding for these types of suits 
available, for example by agreed or court ordered carve outs from a secured lender’s 
collateral.8 Taken together, this means that since no individual creditor has to fund 
what could be expensive litigation, director and officer claims alleging wrongdoing 
in the face of insolvency get pursued in bankruptcy cases more often than they do 
outside bankruptcy.9 
Thus, while much has been written on the law of fiduciary duties of directors of 
insolvent companies over the years,10 this article attempts to add to the existing 
literature with two focuses. First, it considers the legal concepts from the standpoint 
of litigation and litigation strategy (as well as board advice), where relevant focusing 
on bankruptcy court practice.11 Second, it highlights several developments in the 
law of fiduciary duties of officers and directors and deepening insolvency that have 
somewhat changed the landscape in the past several years.12 
Indeed, the changes have been significant, mostly because in the last several years 
the Delaware state courts have had before them a handful of cases that have enabled 
them to consider issues that previously were mostly being litigated in bankruptcy 
courts.13 For the better part of 15 years in the 1990s and early 2000s, after the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s famous decision in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,14 bankruptcy trustees and creditors 
committees routinely asserted claims that directors and officers breached their 
fiduciary duties to creditors while the corporation was in the “zone of insolvency.”15 
As shown below, the concepts of a “zone of insolvency” (as opposed to actual 
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and Creditors Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 
859–71 (1982) (describing how bankruptcy laws allow creditors to act collectively to avoid “race(s) to use 
individual remedies”). 
 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2014); In re Cooper Commons LLC, 512 F.3d 533, 535–36 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 9. See In re Cooper Commons, 512 F.3d at 535–36 (explaining that a suit may be funded by the lenders 
collateral, thus the individual creditors must not fund litigation); Jackson, supra note 7, at 859–71.  
 10. See, e.g., Richard M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Companies, 3 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405, 406 (1994); J. Haskell Murray, “Latchkey Corporations”: Fiduciary Duties in Wholly 
Owned, Financially Troubled Subsidiaries, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 577, 583–92 (2011); Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. 
Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 1, 4–24 (2007). 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 15. Id. at *108. 
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insolvency) and of duties being owed directly to creditors have been rejected in the 
last few years.16 These changes must be considered by plaintiffs in the way they 
frame complaints, and by defendants in determining whether they have a valid 
motion to dismiss the complaint. Similarly, until approximately 2006, the concept 
of “deepening insolvency” had been gaining “growing acceptance.”17 But after the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Trenwick18 opinion, that trend has reversed. Still, 
some bankruptcy courts believe that certain states would consider deepening 
insolvency as a cause of action,19 and many courts have considered deepening 
insolvency to be a valid damages theory.20 
Another significant area of recent change is the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
November 2010 pronouncement that creditors of an insolvent limited liability 
company (“LLC”) cannot obtain standing—even derivative standing—to sue for 
breach of fiduciary duty.21 This, of course, makes LLCs (and limited partnerships) 
different in this respect than corporations, and as shown below, raises questions 
about the pursuit of claims in a bankruptcy case when the debtor is an LLC or a 
limited partnership (“LP”).22 More recently, cases such as Quadrant23 have grappled 
with a topic of significance to many companies that wind up in Chapter 11 cases: to 
what extent can a board that is controlled by an equity holder choose an aggressive 
business strategy designed to maximize a return to equity holders which puts 
creditor recovery at risk. Understanding these and other new developments is vital 
to crafting a complaint that survives a motion to dismiss and to defending such a 
suit. 
These concepts are considered in more detail below, after a background on 
fiduciary duty law which sets the foundation for how these concepts differ—or do 
not differ—with respect to insolvent companies.24 
I. Fiduciary Duties of Directors Generally 
The concept of fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors stems back to 
older trust law: the law imposes fiduciary duties upon those who control property 
 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part IV; e.g., In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 752 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re LTV Steel 
Co., 333 B.R. 397, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). 
 18. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 204 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d sub nom., 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
 19. See, e.g., Official Comm. v. R.F. Lafferty, 276 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 20. See, e.g., Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 2008); Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. 
Supp. 488, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 21. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238, 254 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 22. See infra Part III.C. 
 23. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990–VCL, 2014 WL 5465535, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2014). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
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for the benefit of another.25 Thus, directors and officers of corporations, who are 
entrusted with overseeing and managing the business affairs of the corporation for 
its stockholder owners, owe fiduciary duties to stockholders.26 As set forth below in 
Section F, in Delaware27 and many other states, directors and officers of solvent 
corporations owe fiduciary duties only to stockholders, but some states have a 
“constituency statute,” allowing directors to consider the interest of other 
constituencies as well.28 Thus, when pursuing a claim in bankruptcy court, it is vital 
to understand which state’s law applies to the claim. 
The so called “triad” of fiduciary duties are the duties of loyalty, care, and good 
faith29 (the last of which might not be its own duty, as set forth in Section C 
below).30 In most cases, directors are entitled to judicial deference for their business 
decisions and also are shielded from personal liability by the so-called “business 
judgment rule.”31 As explained below, the prerequisite for invoking the rule is a 
business decision made in the absence of potentially conflicting personal interests, 
with care, and in good faith.32 
A. Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires a director in managing the corporation’s affairs to exercise 
the degree of care that an “ordinarily careful and prudent [person] would use in 
similar circumstances.”33 The duty of care arises primarily in two scenarios. First, 
prior to making a business decision, directors must call forth and consider material 
information reasonably available to them.34 Second, directors also have a duty to 
 
 25. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939). 
 26. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. 
 27. See infra Part II.F. In large measure, this article focuses on Delaware law for three reasons: (a) a large 
percentage of corporations are incorporated in Delaware, so its law has increased importance; (b) it has by far 
the most extensive, well developed body of case law on these subjects; and (c) largely due to (a) and (b), many 
courts in other states view Delaware case law to be persuasive on these issues. See, e.g., Emprise Bank v. 
Rumisek, 215 P.3d 621, 632 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (“[B]ecause Kansas corporate indemnity law is modeled after 
Delaware’s law on the subject, . . . we look to Delaware for guidance.”); Beard v. Love, 173 P.3d 796, 802 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 2007) (“[Because] the Oklahoma General Corporation Act is based on the Delaware Act, decisions of 
the Delaware Courts are very persuasive.” (citations omitted)). 
 28. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 85, 85 (1999). 
 29. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986). 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 32. See infra Part II.D. 
 33. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
 34. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
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exercise care in overseeing and investigating the conduct of corporate employees, 
often referred to as the “duty of oversight.”35 Liability for breach of the duty of 
oversight may be imposed if either “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any 
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a 
system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.”36 
B. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from engaging in self-dealing or 
usurping corporate opportunities in the performance of his or her duties as a 
director.37 Material financial interests held by a director that conflict with or are 
potentially in conflict with the interest of the company directly implicate this duty.38 
C. Duty of Good Faith 
Traditionally, Delaware case law referred to good faith as the third of the “triad” of 
fiduciary duties.39 More recently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified 
that “the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary 
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”40 That 
opinion settled a long-running academic debate, but likely has little practical effect 
on a board’s deliberations and fiduciary duty litigation, since directors still must act 
in good faith in discharging their duties of care and loyalty. In other words, citing 
Stone, a bankruptcy court might dismiss a count titled “breach of duty of good 
faith,” but decline to dismiss a separate count called “breach of duty of loyalty” 
based on the same conduct; the dismissal of the good faith count likely will have 
little or no impact on the rest of the litigation. 
Additionally, directors may not act in a manner such that they “knew that they 
were making material decisions without adequate information and without 
 
 35. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 36. Stone ex. rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (emphasis omitted); 
accord In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 37. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (finding that corporate directors’ fiduciary duty 
“requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be no conflict 
between duty and self-interest”). 
 38. In re Healthco Int’l., Inc., 208 B.R. 288, 302 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). 
 39. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994). 
 40. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the 
corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.”41 
D. The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule is a series of judicially created “presumption[s] that 
directors are acting independently, in good faith and with due care in making a 
business decision.”42 Indeed, it is an “elementary precept of corporation law . . . 
[that] in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate 
officer or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may be 
suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors authorized in 
good faith.”43 This is the case even where the court believes that the board’s 
decision, in hindsight, is “substantively wrong, . . . ‘stupid,’ . . . ‘egregious’ or 
‘irrational.’”44 
The business judgment rule can be rebutted by a showing of a breach of the duty 
of care, loyalty, or good faith.45 Once the business judgment rule is rebutted, the 
burden shifts to the directors to prove the transaction was entirely fair to the 
corporation.46 The shifting of the burden can often be outcome determinative 
because that burden is so difficult (but not impossible) to meet.47 Thus, litigation 
often centers on the issue of whether the business judgment rule has been rebutted. 
For example, an entire body of case law examines whether a director is “interested” 
in a transaction due to a financial interest in it,48 or because a director is “beholden” 
to other interested directors, either though familial relationships or because the 
director’s financial fortunes are tied in some way (salary and continued 
employment for an inside director, substantial director, consulting or other fees for 
others) to the interested director.49 
In insolvency litigation, the plaintiff will often attempt to plead around the 
business judgment rule by alleging that a director was a large stockholder (or a 
designee of a large stockholder, such as an employee of a private equity firm that is a 
 
 41. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); accord In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 42. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997); accord Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  
 43. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 44. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 45. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994). 
 46. Id. at 361. See also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994); Shamrock 
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
 47. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 48. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 
A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 49. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
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majority stockholder of the debtor) and chose a business strategy that favored 
stockholders at the expense of creditors. This type of allegation has had mixed 
success—some courts have accepted this theory while others have rejected it.50 
Ultimately, it might well be that the distinction turns on the facts of the case. 
E. Pleading Standards Concerning the Business Judgment Rule Differ in State and 
Federal Courts 
Interestingly, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the standard for determining 
whether the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the business judgment 
rule differs between federal courts (including bankruptcy courts) on the one hand 
and the Delaware Court of Chancery on the other, even though their respective 
versions of Rule 8 are substantially similar. Delaware courts require plaintiffs to 
plead “with particularity facts showing that the challenged decision was not the 
result of a valid business judgment.”51 In contrast, Federal courts only require the 
plaintiff to “make out a claim upon which relief can be granted,” i.e., notice 
pleading, recognizing that “[i]f more facts are necessary to resolve or clarify the 
disputed issues, the parties may avail themselves of the civil discovery mechanisms 
under the Federal Rules.”52 Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
Delaware’s stricter pleading standard when the business judgment rule is in play 
does not apply in federal courts, even when the federal court considers a motion to 
dismiss a complaint that implicates Delaware’s business judgment rule.53 While this 
standard has been criticized as altering substantive state law,54 several courts have 
adopted the Third Circuit’s approach and apply federal pleading standards to 
 
 50. Compare In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 B.R. 820, 845 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (finding that the 
business judgment rule was not rebutted despite directors’ large stockholdings), with In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of 
Del., 327 B.R. 537, 550 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005), aff’d, 278 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2008).  The most recent and 
perhaps most interesting opinions addressing this subject, the Quadrant opinions, apply the entire fairness 
standard when the controlling stockholder caused the corporation to enter into transactions with the 
controlling stockholder, but the business judgment rule when the controlled board makes business decisions 
that, while characterized as risky and standing to benefit only shareholders, have some rational basis of 
increasing firm value.  See Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 185, 187–88 (Del. Ch. 
2014); Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990–VCL, 2014 WL 5465535, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2014).  
 51. See In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 237 (quoting Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). 
 53. See id. at 232. 
 54. See IT Grp., Inc. v. D’Aniello, No. 04-1268-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27869, at *30, *33 n.10 (D. Del. 
Nov. 15, 2005) (noting that Delaware’s pleading requirements for breach of fiduciary duty claims are “an 
entirely deliberate decision of substantive Delaware law” rather than mere procedure, and finding that applying 
federal pleading standards to such claims “chang[es] the scope of Delaware fiduciary duty claims by weakening 
a substantive presumption”).  It should be noted that the District Court judge who authored the IT Grp. 
opinion subsequently was elevated to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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determine whether a plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the business 
judgment rule.55 
However, it is not necessarily easier for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss 
a fiduciary duty claim in Federal court as opposed to the Delaware state courts. 
After all, in Federal courts, plaintiffs must assure compliance with the recent 
Supreme Court pronouncements of Twombly56 and Iqbal,57 which in some sense 
raise federal pleading standards by requiring a “plausible” basis for the relief sought. 
The Delaware Supreme Court has rejected the Twombley/Iqbal “plausibility” 
standard for cases filed in Delaware state courts.58 Thus, an odd dichotomy exists: a 
plaintiff choosing to file a fiduciary duty suit in Delaware state court need not meet 
the plausibility standard, but does need to plead with particularity why the business 
judgment rule is rebutted, while a plaintiff choosing to file in Federal court has the 
opposite burden. 
As set forth below, the business judgment rule continues to operate with full 
force (and may be rebutted upon the same showing) when the plaintiff is a trustee, 
creditors committee, or creditor, and the allegation is a breach of fiduciary duty to 
the insolvent enterprise.59 
F. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in a Solvent Corporation 
A director of a solvent corporation owes fiduciary obligations to the corporation 
itself.60 Those same fiduciary obligations extend to the corporation’s stockholders 
because, as owners of the business enterprise, they are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the corporation’s growth and increased value.61 In many states, including Delaware, 
directors of a solvent corporation owe no fiduciary obligation to the corporation’s 
 
 55. See, e.g., Kunelius v. Town of Stow, 588 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2009); Responsible Person of Musicland 
Holding Corp. v. Best Buy Co. (In re Musicland Holding Corp.), 398 B.R. 761, 788 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re 
Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 287, 312–13 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (applying federal (rather than 
Ohio) procedural law to determine the sufficiency of breach of fiduciary duty claims); Rafool v. Goldfarb Corp. 
(In re Fleming Packaging Corp.), 370 B.R. 774, 785–86 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); Campbell v. Cathcart (In re 
Derivium Capital, LLC), 380 B.R. 407, 417 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); Panos v. Sullivan (In re Sabine, Inc.), 2006 
Bankr. LEXIS 381, at *20 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2006). 
 56. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 57. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 58. See Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital Partners III L.P., 36 A.3d 348 (Del. 2012); Central Mortg. Co. v. 
Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531 (Del. 2011). 
 59. See infra Part III.A. 
 60. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 61. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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creditors.62 Courts in these states have rejected efforts to expand the fiduciary 
obligations of directors of solvent corporations to creditors, finding that a creditor’s 
rights are fixed by contract with the corporation.63 Delaware courts have 
emphasized that “creditors are usually better able to protect themselves than 
dispersed shareholders.”64 Indeed, in Delaware, favoring a creditor over a 
stockholder of a solvent corporation (absent a legal obligation to do so) may 
constitute a breach of the director’s fiduciary obligation.65 
However, thirty-two states currently have “constituency statutes.”66 These 
statutes largely were adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s in response to holdings 
like Revlon67 that, when faced with takeover overtures or similar decisions, directors 
(of solvent companies) only were permitted to consider what was in the best 
interests of stockholders, rather than what is in the best interests of, for example, 
the community in which the corporation has its principal operations, creditors, 
employees, retired employees and beneficiaries or the environment.68 Typical 
constituency statues permit, but do not require, directors to consider such 
constituencies in addition to the interests of stockholders in making business 
decisions.69 
II. Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a Troubled Corporation 
A. Duty Owed to the Corporation as a Whole 
When a corporation becomes insolvent, directors continue to owe a fiduciary duty 
to the corporation as a whole. However, unlike for a solvent corporation, what is in 
the best interests of an insolvent corporation might not be what is in the best 
 
 62. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (“Before a fiduciary duty arises, an existing 
property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist.”); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 
879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (explaining that duties to creditors of solvent company are contractual, rather than 
fiduciary, in nature); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 947 (Del. 
Ch. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005) (“[T]he general rule is that the directors of a 
debtor company do not owe the creditors any duty beyond the relevant contractual terms.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons, 
549 A.2d at 303; Katz, 508 A.2d at 879. 
 64. Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, 922 A.2d 1169, 1180 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 65. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84. 
 66. See 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(3)(A) (4th ed. 2013) (noting that thirty-two states have 
constituency statutes); e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 515–17, 1715–17 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) 
(West 1999); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2002).  The American Bar Association’s Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act does not contain a constituency statute.  See generally Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate 
Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95–96 (1999). 
 67. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84. 
 68. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003). 
 69. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b). 
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interests of stockholders.70 Until recently, Delaware cases often stated that, upon 
insolvency, the class of constituencies to whom directors owe duties expands to 
include creditors.71 As detailed below, more recent cases dispelled the notion of 
duties being owed directly to creditors, but nevertheless continue to acknowledge 
that upon and after insolvency, creditor interests matter.72 
B. Why Insolvency Effects the Analysis 
One rationale for considering creditors’ interests upon insolvency is the “trust 
fund” theory, which analogizes that the directors of an insolvent company hold the 
company’s assets in trust for the benefit of creditors.73 This “strand of authority 
[is] . . . by no means universally praised. . . .”74 Among other things, the theory 
better explains why self-dealing transactions may be wrongful upon insolvency than 
in providing a basis to consider creditors’ interests in ordinary third party 
transactions.75 Arguably, the Delaware Court of Chancery has now expressly 
rejected the trust fund doctrine.76 A second rationale, the “at risk” theory, 
contemplates that as a corporation approaches insolvency, corporate directors may 
adopt inappropriately high-risk strategies to save value for stockholders.77 In doing 
 
 70. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); 
Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 71. Certain bankruptcy courts or courts in other states interpreted this to mean that a “shift” occurred 
such that corporate directors no longer owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders upon insolvency.  See, e.g., Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982).  That interpretation was not a correct 
statement of Delaware law.  See Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172–73 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court’s Bovay opinion “could be interpreted” to have provided for 
such a shift).  Rather, pre-Gheewalla Delaware decisions held that upon insolvency, directors’ fiduciary duties 
expand to include both creditors and stockholders.  See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 
(Del. Ch. 1992).  Indeed, the Chancery Court has stated that “[w]hile it is true that a board of directors of an 
insolvent corporation or one operating in the vicinity of insolvency has fiduciary duties to creditors and others 
as well as to its stockholders, it is not true that our law countenances, permits, or requires directors to conduct 
the affairs of an insolvent corporation in a manner that is inconsistent with principles of fairness or in breach of 
duties owed to the stockholders.”  Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. CIV.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at *11 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 25, 2002). 
 72. See infra Part II.C. 
 73. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 
1266, 1268–69 (5th Cir. 1983); Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Bovay v. H.M. 
Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944); Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931). 
 74. Prod. Res. Grp., 863 A.2d at 791. 
 75. See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 76. See Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 185 (characterizing the count of the complaint which it dismissed as “[i]n 
effect . . . assert[ing] a variant of Bovay’s trust fund doctrine” and holding that the count “does not state a 
claim”). 
 77. Donald S. Bernstein & Amit Sibal, Current Developments: Fiduciary Duties of Directors & Corporate 
Governance in the Vicinity of Insolvency, in 23
RD
 ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND 
REORGANIZATION 653, 658 (Practising Law Institute ed., vol. 1 2001). 
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so, directors may put creditors, who at that point likely are the true residual 
claimants to and beneficiaries of the corporation, at risk if they were solely charged 
with maximizing value for stockholders.78 Delaware law holds that a board is 
“ordinarily . . . free to take economic risk for the benefit of the firm’s equity owners, 
so long as the directors comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting 
and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s 
value.”79 Of course, what constitutes a plausible strategy itself also turns on the facts 
and can be a subject of disagreement, as the Quadrant case, discussed below, aptly 
demonstrates.80 
C. The Origin and Demise of the “Zone of Insolvency” and the Concept of Duties Being 
Owed Directly to Creditors 
The Credit Lyonnais81 court stated in a footnote that when operating a solvent 
company 
in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both 
the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge 
from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or 
any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the 
opportunity to act.82 
The court concluded that “[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity 
of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk 
bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”83 
Many courts and commentators read this footnote to hold that creditors 
affirmatively have the right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to them by filing suit 
against directors and officers, as long as the company is in the so-called “zone of 
insolvency.”84 This led to a multitude of complaints—mostly filed in bankruptcy 
courts—by creditors committees, litigation trusts and trustees, against directors for 
 
 78. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 1099, 1155 n.55 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 79. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. 2007) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del. Ch. 2004)). 
 80. See infra Parts II.D–E. 
 81. Credit Lyonnais Bank, 17 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1102. 
 82. Id. at 1155 n.55. 
 83. Id. at 1155. 
 84. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. 
Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968–69 (D. Del. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss because a complaint alleged that even 
if the company was not insolvent, it was at least in the zone of insolvency). 
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breach of fiduciary duties for alleged failure to prefer the interests of creditors over 
stockholders of troubled, but arguably solvent, companies.85 
In Production Resources,86 the Delaware Court of Chancery called into question 
whether Credit Lyonnais actually provided a mechanism for creditor recoveries.87 
The court stated that “Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from 
stockholders who claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so 
long as the company would not technically breach any legal obligations.”88 This 
shield helps creditors because “directors, it can be presumed, generally take 
seriously the company’s duty to pay its bills as a first priority.”89 The court stated 
that the cases that “somewhat oddly . . . read [Credit Lyonnais] as creating a new 
body of creditor’s rights law. . . . [are] not unproblematic.”90 After noting several 
theoretical problems with imposing on directors fiduciary duties to creditors of 
not-yet insolvent corporations, the court concluded that it “doubt[ed] the wisdom 
of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called 
zone.”91 Production Resources, however, did not state that the zone of insolvency has 
become irrelevant. Indeed, the court, by explaining its prior holding in Credit 
Lyonnais, reaffirmed that directors and officers are permitted (but not required) to 
take into account the interests of creditors, as well as stockholders, when 
determining what is in the corporation’s best interests once a company has entered 
the zone of insolvency—a significant change from the primary tasks of officers and 
directors when a company is financially healthy.92 That change was intended to 
reflect a “shield” to protect directors against suits by stockholders, as contemplated 
by Credit Lyonnais.93 Additionally, the Production Resources opinion notes that 
“once a firm becomes insolvent, there is little doubt that creditors can press 
derivative claims arguing that directors’ pre-insolvency conduct injured the firm.”94 
Three years after Production Resources was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court 
in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. 
Gheewalla95 stated: 
 
 85. See, e.g., id.; In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 327 B.R. 537, 550 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005), aff’d, 278 Fed. 
Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 B.R. 820, 845 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). 
 86. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 87. Id. at 788. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 787–88, 789. 
 91. Id. at 790 n.57. 
 92. Id. at 790–91. 
 93. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 1099, 1155 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 94. Prod. Res. Grp., 863 A.2d at 789 n.56 (emphasis added). 
 95. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
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When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus 
for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge 
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising 
their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the 
benefit of its shareholder owners.96 
While the quotation is dictum, it suggests that under Gheewalla, a creditor of a 
marginally solvent Delaware corporation operating in the zone of insolvency may 
not bring a direct or derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duty.97 Courts in other 
states have followed suit. For example, in Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle,98 the 
California Court of Appeals held that “there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under 
California law that is owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue 
of its operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”99 
While the Gheewalla court was not presented with the issue of whether the board 
could use the zone of insolvency as a “shield” against stockholder suits if the board 
determined to favor a course of action preferred by creditors, its “for the benefit of 
its stockholder owners” language has created some confusion as to whether the 
“shield” of the zone of insolvency remains viable.100 The zone of insolvency could 
still be a relevant concept if it still permits the “shield.” Especially after the 
Quadrant opinion, litigators might be better served by framing these types of issues 
in terms of what the business judgment rule does and does not permit, rather than 
whether a shield is available to protect one set of interests over another. 
Despite this case law, the zone of insolvency cannot be entirely ignored101 because 
some opinions (especially outside of Delaware state courts) issued after Production 
Resources have continued to emphasize the zone of insolvency.102 Now that 
Gheewalla has had more time to be understood and digested by the legal 
community, however, the distinction between merely being financially troubled as 
 
 96. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 101–03. 
 98. Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Russell Silberglied & Jonathan P. Friedland, Did the Delaware Supreme Court Break the ‘Directors’ 
Shield’?, 24 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 1 (2007). 
 101. Decision making in the zone also cannot ignore creditors’ interests—whether a duty exists at that 
moment or not—because “once a firm becomes insolvent, there is little doubt that creditors [or a trustee or 
creditors committee] can press derivative claims arguing that directors’ pre-insolvency conduct injured the 
firm.”  Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (emphasis added).  
This rule has developed because “if creditors lack standing to assert claims that pre-date the point of insolvency, 
then the number of possible plaintiffs will be few: stockholders will lack the incentive, and creditors will lack the 
standing.”  Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 180 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 327 B.R. 537, 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (denying a motion 
for summary judgment and stating that the plaintiff could recover at trial if it met its burden of proving “that 
Hechinger was operating in the vicinity of insolvency” at the time of the alleged misconduct). 
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opposed to insolvent has come into focus. In one recent opinion, the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss a complaint which alleged that the 
defendant’s “misconduct propelled the Debtors into insolvency, which ultimately 
led to the filing of its bankruptcy cases” some time later.103 That allegation 
amounted to an admission that the company was not insolvent at the time of the 
alleged misconduct and did not become insolvent immediately upon the occurrence 
of the alleged misconduct, so it did not suffice to confer standing under 
Ghewealla.104 
Gheewalla separately confirmed that upon actual insolvency, directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation itself.105 The Gheewalla court recognized that 
upon insolvency, what is in the best interests of the corporation often departs from 
what is in the best interests of stockholders, noting that “[w]hen a corporation is 
insolvent . . . its creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual 
beneficiaries of any increase in value.”106 Thus, the directors’ duty is “to maximize 
the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest 
in it”—whether creditors or stockholders.107 A breach of that duty may be enforced 
by a creditor (or presumably a creditors committee) with derivative standing, but 
not by a direct claim.108 In other words, a creditor, as among the class of residual 
beneficiaries, can derivatively enforce the directors’ duties to the company, but 
there is no duty owed directly to any individual creditor.109 
Similarly, the Court of Chancery has confirmed that there is no duty to “do what 
was best for a particular class of . . . creditors.”110 That guidance is helpful because 
language in certain case law discussing the “interests of creditors” oversimplifies the 
situation facing most boards of insolvent companies—that they have at least one if 
not more classes of secured debt as well as unsecured trade debt, and the holders of 
each tranche of debt have very different—sometimes directly adverse—interests 
and goals. Of course, the quoted language from Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking 
 
 103. In re Tropicana Entm’t, LLC, 520 B.R. 455, 471 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). 
 104. Id. at 472. 
 105. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007). 
 106. Id. Note that this “residual beneficiary” concept is not necessarily accurate if the corporation only is 
cash flow insolvent but balance sheet solvent or only marginally balance sheet insolvent.  In such a case, the 
residual beneficiary of enough of an increase in value might well be stockholders. 
 107. Id. at 103. 
 108. Id. See also Cellco P’ship v. Bane (In re Bane), 426 B.R. 152, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010) (calling 
“preposterous” an argument that creditors can have direct standing where stockholders would not “given . . . 
that, after a corporation becomes insolvent, all a creditor really does is to step into the shoes of such 
corporation’s shareholders (whose shares are worthless)”). 
 109. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 102. 
 110. Shandler v. DLJ Merch. Banking, Inc., C.A. No. 4797-VCS, 2010 WL 2929654, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 26, 
2010) (emphasis added). 
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only refers to fiduciary duties of the board,111 but the board still must comply with 
other provisions of the law, which in a Chapter 11 case of course includes the 
absolute priority rule.112 
The parties must consider the distinctions described in the preceding paragraphs 
when framing a complaint or presenting a defense; describing the fiduciary duty as 
being owed to the wrong class or person can result in case dismissal.113 However, it 
is not clear whether these distinctions make a practical difference to a board of 
directors that is considering a variety of business decisions: whether the directors 
should act in the best interests of creditors as a whole, or in the best interest of the 
company—the residual beneficiaries of which are creditors, probably makes little 
difference in most instances.114 
In Berg & Berg, the California Court of Appeals similarly confirmed that 
directors of an insolvent California corporation owe duties to the corporation.115 
The court declined to create a “broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or 
loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe to the corporation’s creditors 
solely because of a state of insolvency.”116 However, it did leave open the door for a 
limited class of such claims: 
We accordingly hold that the scope of any extra-contractual duty owed by 
corporate directors to the insolvent corporation’s creditors is limited in 
California, consistent with the trust-fund doctrine, to the avoidance of 
actions that divert, dissipate or unduly risk corporate assets that might 
otherwise be used to pay creditors claims. This would include acts that 
involve self-dealing or the preferential treatment of creditors.117 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2005). 
 113. See, e.g., Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., C.A. No. 2578-VCP, 2009 WL 4345724, at *20-21 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2009) (dismissing a complaint in part because it pleaded that an officer owed fiduciary duties 
to a creditor rather than to the company, thereby impermissibly asserting a direct claim); Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc. v. Technical Olympics, S.A. (In re Tousa, Inc.), 437 B.R. 447 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss because claims were properly asserted as derivative claims, not direct 
claims of creditors); U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App. 2009) (same). 
 114. The Gheewalla court was concerned about the board’s ability to negotiate with a particular creditor, 
and whether owing fiduciary duties to creditors would interfere with the ability to negotiate. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d at 103. It is not clear that conceptualizing fiduciary duties as being owed to the creditor body as a whole 
would interfere with a board’s ability to negotiate with one particular creditor. 
 115. Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to 
adopt a “broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty” owing to creditors in part because doing so 
“would conflict with and dilute the statutory and common law duties that directors already owe to shareholders 
and the corporation” (emphasis added)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
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The Berg & Berg court did not specify whether such claims are direct or derivative, 
but since it phrased the duty as being owed “to the insolvent corporation’s 
creditors,” it appears that a limited set of direct claims are envisioned in California, 
unlike in Delaware.118 In contrast, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted 
Gheewalla in full, so creditors of insolvent Tennessee corporations may only bring 
derivative claims.119 
Because Gheewalla suggests that derivative claims are not available to creditors of 
solvent companies operating in the zone, but such claims are available to creditors 
of insolvent companies, and Berg & Berg likewise permits limited fiduciary duty 
claims upon insolvency but not in the zone, the key question has shifted from 
whether the company is close to insolvent (i.e., in the “zone”) to whether it is 
insolvent in fact.120 That is not an easy question to answer, since often post-hoc 
valuations will differ by wide margins.121 The former chief justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court advises that a board “need[s] the best financial and legal advice 
obtainable in order to determine on which side of the solvency line the corporation 
is sitting.”122 
D. Balancing Competing Interests of the Various Constituencies 
Directors and officers of an insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation as a whole, and prudence dictates that they must consider the interests 
of creditors as well as stockholders in determining what is in the corporation’s best 
interests.123 That often creates tension. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
directive to “maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all 
those having an interest in it”124 to a certain degree begs the question: long term 
value or short term value? For example, efforts to maximize the corporation’s 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Sanford v. Waugh & Co., 328 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tenn. 2010). 
 120. See Silberglied & Friedland, supra note 100, at 1–3; see also In re Tropicana Entm’t, LLC, 520 B.R. 455, 
471 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (dismissing a complaint because it only alleged that actions “propelled the debtors 
into insolvency” some time later, not that the debtors were insolvent at the time); Burch v. Huston (In re US 
Digital, Inc.), 443 B.R. 22, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“[T]he Director Defendants cannot have breached their 
fiduciary duty to US Digital and its creditors while operating in the ‘zone of insolvency’ because they did not 
owe such a duty under Delaware law.  However, as Gheewalla makes clear, when US Digital became insolvent, 
the Director Defendants owed fiduciary duties to US Digital and its creditors.”). 
 121. See Silberglied & Friedland, supra note 100, at 3; see also Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1022 
(recognizing the “practical problems with creating [a broad duty to creditors], among them a director’s ability 
to objectively and concretely determine when a state of insolvency actually exists such that his or her duties to 
creditors have been triggered”). 
 122. E. Norman Veasey, Former Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court, Presentation at the American 
College of Bankruptcy Conference: Counseling the Board of Directors of the Company in Distress 15 (Mar. 15, 
2008) (on file with author). 
 123. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 791 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 124. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007). 
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ability to pay its debts may, in some instances, conflict with maximizing the long 
term value of the company, and thus the value of the stockholders’ interest in the 
corporation (e.g., by using current cash flow to make investments for future 
growth).125 Therefore, directors of a financially troubled company often walk a fine 
line to strike a balance between the interests of creditors and those of stockholders, 
or between various classes of creditors, and litigation often involves after-the-fact 
second guessing of that balance.126 
When presented with such conflicting interests among constituents, the directors 
should “choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise 
rather than any single group interested in the corporation.”127 What that means in a 
given case turns on the facts of the case, but it is important to understand that non-
conflicted decisions based on adequate information usually are not second guessed 
by courts merely because the directors chose a course of action that one set of 
stakeholders did not favor.128 In this respect, a court’s review of directors’ choices of 
what actions to take upon insolvency would be approached no differently than a 
court’s review of any other business decision of a solvent or insolvent company—
the business judgment rule applies unless it has been rebutted, which can be 
achieved by showing that the decision was a product of gross negligence or self-
interest.129 Indeed, the Gheewalla court’s holding that directors can choose to take 
on risk if they select a “plausible strategy” is consistent with a gross negligence 
standard of review.130 
Consequently, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that directors did not 
breach their fiduciary duties to stockholders in allowing a creditor, who agreed 
voluntarily to pay off the company’s unsecured creditors, to foreclose on the 
debtors’ property, because the directors “reasonably believed that a bankruptcy 
filing[, which was the option advocated by the stockholders,] would produce 
negative returns for all . . . constituencies, including its stockholders.”131 Similarly, 
the Court of Chancery held that directors did not breach their fiduciary duties to 
stockholders in selling operating assets for less than the amount of the company’s 
debt, ensuring no return to equity, because there was no competing bidder and the 
company’s cash flow crisis would have imminently resulted in a bankruptcy filing.132 
Applying Delaware law, a New York court likewise held that Bear Stearns’ directors 
 
 125. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 126. This is one reason why the business judgment rule is so important in this context.  See infra Part II.E. 
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did not breach their fiduciary duties to stockholders in selling to JP Morgan at a low 
price, in part, because other alternatives would have been risky to creditors, the 
company was insolvent or nearly insolvent, and creditors likely would not have 
recovered anything in a bankruptcy case.133 
There are, of course, some notable exceptions. For example, in Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc.,134 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board breached its 
fiduciary duties by agreeing to a lock-up and a no-shop provision in a merger 
agreement with a no “fiduciary out” clause with Genesis, thereby ultimately 
resulting in the board recommending a merger to stockholders that turned out to 
be at a lower price than a later emerging, competing offer that provided more for 
stockholders.135 The company was insolvent and previous offers made by the 
competing offeror, Omnicare, had involved bankruptcy sales.136 Genesis instead 
offered a going-concern sale outside of bankruptcy court but insisted upon the 
merger agreement containing no “fiduciary out” clause.137 In approving the Genesis 
deal, the board concluded that the risk of loss of this deal if the board insisted on a 
fiduciary out (which Genesis was unwilling to give)—and thereby possibly having 
no deal and risking the ability to pay creditors—was not warranted when weighed 
against the uncertainty of ever receiving a possibly superior proposal.138 
Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board was required to 
contract for an effective “fiduciary out” clause in order to exercise its continuing 
fiduciary duties to minority stockholders.139 
While some were surprised by Omnicare, there is no requirement to favor the 
interests of creditors (or preferred stockholders)140 over common stockholders solely 
because the company is on the brink of insolvency.141 Rather, the board is entitled to 
choose a range of options, so long as the board acts in good faith and in an 
informed manner.142 Perhaps the most vivid example of this is the recent Quadrant 
opinion. The company was insolvent, had ceased operations, and its only remaining 
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activity was investing its securities.143 The plaintiff/creditor alleged that the board, 
dominated by interested directors, re-invested the funds into riskier securities, 
thereby jeopardizing creditor recoveries and solely benefiting the out-of-the-money 
stockholders, who hoped the riskier investments would pan out and provide a 
return to equity.144 The court held that unless the business judgment rule was 
rebutted145—and it held that it was not—this theory did not state a claim.146 
While Quadrant demonstrates that directors—even ones who benefit from risk 
taking—can win litigation by raising such claims, excessive risk taking might not be 
advisable for directors of troubled companies. As the former Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court has written, “directorial focus on the best interests of 
corporate viability and a skeptical view of the wisdom of aggressive risk-taking 
would seem to be the best advice for fiduciaries of a corporation that is close to the 
line.”147 Two other considerations should be noted. First, while the Quadrant 
opinion dismissed the counts relating to risky investment strategy, it denied a 
motion to dismiss several counts alleging that the company’s direct transactions 
with insiders were not entirely fair.148 Second, just because an action might be 
permissible as a matter of fiduciary duty law does not necessarily make it advisable 
or immune from a different cause of action. For example, upon insolvency or 
earlier under the “unreasonably small capital” test, risky transactions can be second 
guessed as fraudulent transfers, and a company risks violations of covenants in loan 
documents or bond indentures.149 
E. The Business Judgment Rule in Creditor Cases 
Gheewalla confirms that the nature of fiduciary duties does not change upon 
insolvency.150 Rather, as described above, the identity of the constituencies who 
benefit from those duties simply change. Accordingly, “[t]he debtor has a duty to 
use reasonable care in making decisions but once those decisions are made, the 
debtor is protected by the business judgment rule.”151 Thus, regardless of the 
identity of the person or entity which files suit—stockholder or creditor—the 
business decisions of the directors of an insolvent corporation are given the same 
degree of judicial deference as business decisions of the directors of solvent 
 
 143. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 167 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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 145. See infra Part II.E. 
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 147. Veasey, supra note 122, at 15. 
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companies.152 “Because the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of 
the directors’ duties, which is the firm itself, the business judgment rule remains 
important and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, 
prudent judgments about the risks they should undertake on behalf of troubled 
firms.”153 Thus, “even when [a company is] insolvent, the board [is] entitled to 
exercise a good faith business judgment to continue to operate the business if it 
believed that was what would maximize . . . value.”154 
While the application of the business judgment rule ensures that courts will not 
second guess business decisions of a disinterested board of directors acting in an 
informed manner and in good faith,155 creditors nevertheless can prove liability in 
the same manner as can stockholders of a Delaware corporation who seek to rebut 
the business judgment rule.156 One popular theory in many complaints argues that 
the board’s decisions were conflicted and improperly colored by consideration of 
one or more directors’ equity ownership interests. This theory has been met with 
mixed success. For example, in Hechinger,157 the court held that the business 
judgment rule had been rebutted for purposes of a motion for summary judgment 
by allegations that the board favored the interests of equity over creditors because 
certain board members owned 65% of the company’s outstanding voting stock.158 In 
contrast, in Radnor,159 a post-trial opinion, the court applied the business judgment 
rule to the directors’ decision to take on more debt to fund a new project over 
allegations that the board was “swinging for the fences” due to its members’ 
ownership of nearly all of the company’s common equity—in other words, an 
allegation that the board was willing to risk creditor recoveries in the hopes that the 
 
 152. See Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Commc’ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting 
that “there is room for application of the business judgment rule” in suits commenced by creditors); Prod. Res. 
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new business venture would make the company return to solvency and provide 
value to the stockholders (i.e. the directors themselves).160 
Quadrant raises the point most directly. The insolvent company already ceased 
its operating business, and was left with securities that were required under its 
operating guidelines to be invested in AAA rated investments.161 An acquirer bought 
the equity of the company at a discount, controlled the board, and implemented a 
plan to change the governing documents to permit riskier investments.162 A 
bondholder sued under a Gheewalla theory, and argued that the business judgment 
rule did not apply because the only beneficiary of the decision to make riskier 
investments was the equity holder who controlled the board;163 after all, equity was 
out of the money, so if the risky investments did not pan out, the equity holder lost 
nothing. The court rejected this theory, holding: 
I do not believe that Quadrant can rebut the business judgment rule by 
alleging that the Board has decided to pursue a relatively more risky 
business strategy to benefit it sole common stockholder, EBF. Although the 
Company is insolvent, and although the directors are dual-fiduciaries, the 
Board does not face a conflict between the interest of the primary residual 
claimants (the creditors) and the interests of the secondary residual 
claimants (the stockholders).164 
From a litigation standpoint, the court provided guidance on what must be 
pleaded and later proved to rebut the business judgment rule in this context: 
It is not enough, however, for a plaintiff simply to argue in the abstract that 
a particular director has a conflict of interest or is acting in bad faith 
because she is affiliated with a particular type of institution that may be 
pursuing a particular business strategy or have a particular interest. There 
must be specific allegations and later, actual evidence sufficient to permit a 
finding that the director faced a conflict or acted with an improper purpose 
on the facts of the case.165 
While there is no post-Gheewalla (or for that matter, post-Credit Lyonnais) 
opinion addressing the subject, an interesting issue is whether the business 
judgment rule could also be rebutted on an allegation that the directors breached 
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their duty of care by not informing themselves as to whether the company was 
insolvent and therefore erroneously operating as if their duties were solely to the 
stockholders. Cases from other contexts demonstrate that directors should be 
mindful of the issue.166 
F. Determination of Insolvency 
As set forth above, under Delaware law, the fiduciary duty to the corporation 
requires the consideration of more than just stockholders upon insolvency, and 
under California law a limited fiduciary duty is owed to creditors upon 
insolvency.167 Thus, determining when a corporation has become insolvent is the 
starting point of analyzing the fiduciary responsibilities of directors of a financially 
troubled company. 
Determining what constitutes insolvency is a subject on which entire articles 
have been written, and thus extends beyond the scope of this article.168 For present 
purposes, it is important to note that there are two standard measures of 
insolvency: the balance sheet test and “equitable insolvency.” Under Delaware law, a 
company is insolvent if it fails either test.169 Thus, when determining whether a 
director’s expanded fiduciary duties are triggered, both tests should be 
considered.170 Moreover, even though the balance sheet test is a “misnomer” and the 
balance sheet is only the “starting point” of that test,171 if the company’s balance 
sheet on its face reflects insolvency, a court is very unlikely to grant a motion to 
 
 166. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding fraud because, when the 
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dismiss a complaint where the board attempts to argue that duties were owed only 
to the stockholders.172 
III. Special Issues in Fiduciary Duty Claims 
A. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
Directors of solvent, wholly owned Delaware subsidiaries owe their fiduciary duties 
exclusively to the parent.173 Thus, the board of a solvent, wholly owned subsidiary 
company would be justified in “tak[ing] action in aid of its parent’s business 
strategy” as long as that action would not “violate legal obligations owed to others,” 
even if those actions made the subsidiary “less valuable as an entity.”174 
Some courts have read this proposition broadly and held that a subsidiary’s 
board’s duties do not change if the subsidiary is insolvent; that is, such courts have 
held that even where the subsidiary is insolvent, the directors of the wholly owned 
subsidiary should govern the subsidiary solely for the benefit of the parent.175 More 
recent opinions have rejected this theory.176 Thus, the more prudent approach (and 
more accepted litigation position) is that directors of an insolvent subsidiary should 
consider the interests of the subsidiary as a whole (including creditors’ interests), 
not just the interests of the parent.177 To the extent that they do not, a lawsuit by a 
creditor, a committee, or a trustee alleging breach of fiduciary duties could survive a 
motion to dismiss. In addition, in at least one recent case, a court refused to dismiss 
claims against the parent’s directors who caused the subsidiary to act in ways 
inimical to the best interests of the subsidiary and its creditors.178 
B. Preferred Stock 
Most of this article focuses on insolvent companies, where case law provides 
derivative standing to creditors under the theory that creditors are the residual 
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beneficiary of an increase in value. For troubled but marginally solvent companies 
that have preferred stock with a liquidation preference, the residual beneficiary of 
an increase or decrease in firm value instead could be the preferred stockholders. 
Bankruptcy practitioners often refer to the level on the corporate capitalization 
table where the firm’s value runs out as the “fulcrum security.”179 
In a recent post-trial opinion, In re Trados,180 the Court of Chancery was faced 
with a company whose fulcrum security was either preferred stock or common 
stock.181 The opinion is most noteworthy for its rejection of any notion that 
preferred stockholders as a tranche were entitled to special protection as the 
residual beneficiaries of increased value.182 It held, instead, that preferred 
stockholders are simply stockholders for purposes of any fiduciary duty analysis, 
and any rights that were different than the rights afforded to common stockholders 
were strictly contractual in nature and could not give rise to any additional 
fiduciary duty.183 
C. Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships 
As a general default rule (i.e., if the governing documents are silent on the point), 
the managers of an LLC and the general partner of an LP owe the same fiduciary 
duties—care, loyalty, and arguably good faith—as do the directors of a corporation 
to its shareholders.184 However, the fiduciary duty analysis for these “alternative 
entities” differ from corporations in two fundamental ways. 
First, a recent Delaware opinion held that creditors of an insolvent Delaware 
LLC can not obtain standing to sue derivatively for breach of fiduciary duty.185 The 
court held that section 18-1002 of Delaware’s LLC Act186 limits standing to pursue 
derivative claims to holders of membership interests in the LLC or their assignees.187 
Creditors are neither, and thus may not obtain derivative standing. The court 
recognized that this created a distinction between corporations and LLC’s, but held 
that “[t]o limit creditors to their bargained-for rights and deny them the additional 
right to sue derivatively on behalf of an insolvent entity comports with the 
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contractarian environment created by the LLC Act.”188 The court explained other 
ways, some unique to LLCs, that creditors may protect themselves without the need 
to pursue fiduciary duty claims derivatively.189 
Thus, when a plaintiff considers filing a fiduciary duty claim or defense counsel 
first starts planning a defense, the first question to ask is whether the debtor is an LP 
or an LLC. If it is, issues of standing must be analyzed. If the trustee or debtor in 
possession filed the suit, it is not a “derivative” case; the company, either through its 
managers (i.e., board) or its court appointed trustee, is simply asserting its own 
claim.190 Furthermore, a litigation trust created pursuant to a plan likely may 
prosecute such a claim without it being considered a derivative claim, if the plan 
assigned the estate’s claim to the trust.191 
The analysis differs if the plaintiff is a creditors committee. Leading cases have 
permitted a creditors committee (or an individual creditor) to pursue claims that 
otherwise belong to the estate and are controlled by the debtor in possession by 
granting the committee “derivative” standing to sue on behalf of the estate or 
debtor.192 Future cases will undoubtedly consider whether, notwithstanding CML v. 
Bax,193 a bankruptcy court has the equitable power to grant such derivative standing 
to a creditors committee of an LLC or LP debtor—which obviously is not a 
“member.”194 
Second, no matter who has standing to sue, the fiduciary duty analysis itself 
differs for alternative entities because they are creatures of contract, and the broadly 
permissive statutes enable LLCs and LPs to modify default rules concerning 
fiduciary duties in the partnership or operating agreement.195 Thus, the Delaware 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act permits modifying and even completely 
eliminating fiduciary duties: 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties 
(including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner 
or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
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expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership 
agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.196 
Delaware’s LLC Act has a nearly verbatim provision.197 It should be noted that the 
Uniform Acts, and therefore the LP and LLC acts of most states other than 
Delaware, permit restriction, but not outright elimination, of fiduciary duties.198 
Sometimes, attempts to modify default fiduciary duties can lead to unintended 
consequences. For example, in General Growth Properties,199 the operating 
agreement attempted to modify fiduciary duties in aide of making the LLC 
“bankruptcy remote.”200 Thus, the operating agreement provided: “[t]o the extent 
permitted by law . . . the Independent Managers shall consider only the interests of 
the Company, including its respective creditors, in acting or otherwise voting on the 
matters [including filing for bankruptcy].”201 This language seems to indicate that 
the parties to the operating agreement contemplated that even if the LLC were 
solvent, the interests of creditors would be considered in an effort to keep the entity 
bankruptcy remote (because as a special purpose entity, the LLC would have one 
main creditor which would not favor a bankruptcy filing). The court held, however, 
that the provision operated differently because it “also provided, appropriately, that 
the Independent Managers can act only to the extent permitted by applicable law, 
which is deemed to be the corporate law of Delaware.”202 Because the LLC was 
solvent, the court held that under Gheewalla, fiduciary duties were owed only to the 
stockholder—and not to creditors.203 Thus, the court interpreted the operating 
agreement in a way that in fact did not alter the default rules of fiduciary duties, 
notwithstanding the apparent attempt to do so. 
Accordingly, when litigating a claim of breach of fiduciary duty involving an LP 
or an LLC, it is crucial to consult the operating or partnership agreement to 
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D. Choice of Law 
This article has focused primarily on Delaware law, even though fiduciary duty 
issues typically are raised in federal bankruptcy courts.204 Of course, as a gating issue, 
litigants must be aware of which state’s law applies to the claims alleged. The 
internal affairs doctrine “requires that the law of the state of incorporation should 
determine issues relating to internal corporate affairs.”205 “Internal corporate affairs 
involve those matters which are peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”206 The fiduciary 
relationship between director, corporation and its constituencies is the sine qua non 
of internal corporate affairs, so the law of the state of incorporation controls 
fiduciary duty issues.207 
However, occasionally courts apply a different state’s laws. For example, one 
bankruptcy court opinion held that New Jersey law applied to a direct claim by a 
creditor against directors of a Delaware corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.208 
While this likely was simply an “outlier” opinion, it is worth noting, particularly 
because the law of other states could—and in Stanziale, did—differ from Delaware 
law as described herein.209 
An issue also occasionally arises over whether any fiduciary based challenge to 
the post-petition conduct of a board is governed by state or federal common law. 
While the Bankruptcy Code does not address fiduciary duties, courts have held that 
debtors in possession (“DIP”) and those who control the DIP have fiduciary duties 
just as a Chapter 7 or 11 trustee would.210 Several bankruptcy courts have referred to 
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this as a separate fiduciary duty imposed on a DIP and its directors, rather than 
fiduciary duties under state law.211 But the source of such a separate duty is 
unclear.212 Some have pointed to 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), but that section merely states 
that a DIP “shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a 
case under this chapter. . . .”213 “Duties,” of course, does not necessarily mean 
“fiduciary duties,” and the source of the “duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case 
under this chapter” is Section 1106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,214 which does not 
mention fiduciary duties. 
But while an interesting academic subject, whether a separate “federal” fiduciary 
duty should attach to directors of a DIP matters little for two reasons. First, the 
overwhelming percentage of litigation concerns pre-petition conduct of directors, 
not post-petition conduct. That is hardly surprising, since post-petition 
transactions outside of the ordinary course of business have to be approved ex ante 
by the bankruptcy court,215 so the grounds to second guess such decisions ex post are 
slim if extant. Indeed, where there is a faithless DIP, the remedy usually is the 
appointment of a trustee under Section 1112(b) to remove the fiduciary or the 
appointment of an examiner under Section 1104(c).216 Second, the majority of 
courts hold that the fiduciary duties of a DIP are similar or the same as those of an 
officer and director outside of bankruptcy.217 Thus, even if there is a distinction 
between whether federal or state fiduciary duties are owed, the distinction might be 
without a difference. 
It is worth noting that the recently released report of the “American Bankruptcy 
Institute Commission to Study Chapter 11 Reform” considered and rejected a 
proposal to federalize fiduciary duty standards inside of Chapter 11: 
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& John Egan, The Sale of the Century or a Fraud on Creditors?: The Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Debtors in 
Possession Relating to the “Sale” of a Debtor’s Assets in Bankruptcy, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 781, 792–93 (1998) 
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If the Bankruptcy Code imposed separate duties on a debtor in possession’s 
directors, officers, or similar managing persons, those duties might differ 
from the duties owed by those individuals under state law. Although federal 
preemption principles might resolve such conflicts from a legal perspective, 
the conflict could cause substantial confusion and uncertainty for directors, 
officers, and similar managing persons. The Commission agreed that state 
law adequately governs fiduciary duties and should continue to govern the 
fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and similar managing persons in 
bankruptcy.218 
The Report, of course, is not law but a series of recommendations.219 Nevertheless, it 
is indicative of the view that the law today neither does nor should provide for 
preemption. 
E. Exculpation 
Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, and statutes of many 
states modeled on Delaware law,220 permit a corporation to include in its certificate 
of incorporation a provision that exculpates its directors from personal liability “to 
the corporation or its stockholders” for monetary damages for breach of the 
fiduciary duty of care.221 Because claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by or 
on behalf of creditors must be derivative in nature,222 they are claims of “the 
corporation” for which the corporation’s directors are exculpated from personal 
liability to the extent they involve the duty of care.223 Thus, Section 102(b)(7) and 
other states’ equivalents provide the same protection from suits filed by creditors, 
trustees or committees as they do in suits filed by stockholders of a solvent 
company.224 
 
 218. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012–2014 FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2014). 
 219. Id. at 2. 
 220. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2010). 
 221. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 222. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007). 
 223. See Continuing Creditors’ Comm. of Star Telecomms., Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 463 (D. 
Del. 2004); In re USA Detergents, Inc., 418 B.R. 533, 544 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT 
Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 793–94 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 224. As set forth above, while the California Court of Appeals did not directly address the issue in Berg & 
Berg, it appears that the limited fiduciary duty it permitted is a direct claim by creditors, not a derivative claim. 
See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  If so, the logic of 
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204(a)(10). 
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Claims for violation of the duty of loyalty, or for acts made in bad faith, are not 
covered by Section 102(b)(7).225 Moreover, some courts have held that even a duty 
of care claim should not be dismissed on section 102(b)(7) grounds where duty of 
loyalty claims are pleaded in the same complaint.226 There is some disagreement on 
this point.227 
Courts often grapple with the issue of what stage of litigation to consider a 
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation defense. In general, federal courts have declined to 
consider this defense on a motion to dismiss, because exculpation is an affirmative 
defense and it is rare that a plaintiff would note such a certificate of incorporation’s 
provision in its complaint.228 The Delaware Supreme Court, in contrast, has 
permitted the consideration of an exculpation clause on a motion to dismiss if the 
certificate of incorporation is indisputably authentic and the safeguards of Rule 56 
are met.229 Some courts also will look to an exculpation clause in dismissing a duty 
of care claim that is not “intertwined” with other claims that would survive a 
motion to dismiss.230 
IV. Deepening Insolvency 
The theory of “deepening insolvency” is closely analogous to a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty.231 Deepening insolvency is a fairly recently created tort (if it is a 
tort).232 It is defined as “an injury to [a debtor’s] corporate property from the 
fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.”233 The 
theory posits that the defendant—typically the board, a majority stockholder, a 
lender, an auditor, or someone else with a “deep pocket”—should have taken action 
to liquidate or wind down the company and did not; as a result, the company was 
less valuable at the time it ultimately was shut down, and therefore less money is 
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 226. In re USA Detergents, 418 B.R. at 544; In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. 548, 568 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2008). 
 227. See In re Frederick’s of Hollywood, Inc., No. C.A. 15944, 2000 WL 130630, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 
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 228. See, e.g., In re Tower Air Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 242 (3d Cir. 2005); Ad Hoc Comm. of Equity Holders of 
Tectonic Network, Inc. v. Wolford, 554 F. Supp. 2d 538, 561 (D. Del. 2008); In re Mervyn’s Holdings, LLC, 426 
B.R. 488, 502–03 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (applying the rule to a California LLC exculpation provision). 
 229. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001). 
 230. In re Fedders N. Am., Inc., 405 B.R. 527, 543 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
 231. See, e.g., In re Global Serv. Grp. LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 460–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also In re 
Fleming Packaging Corp., No. 03-82408, 2005 WL 2205703, at *9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2005) (dismissing a 
deepening insolvency count of a complaint as redundant of a breach of fiduciary duty claim). 
 232. For a history of the development of deepening insolvency, see Hugh M. McDonald et al., Lafferty’s 
Orphan: The Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2007–Jan. 2008. 
 233. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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available to distribute to creditors than would have been but for the prolongation of 
the corporate existence.234 
Until 2006, deepening insolvency had gained “growing acceptance” in 
bankruptcy courts.235 However, more recently, federal courts have scaled back 
deepening insolvency claims.236 Moreover, the Delaware Court of Chancery in 
Trenwick categorically rejected deepening insolvency as an independent theory for 
liability against directors, holding that it does not state a cause of action any more 
than “shallowing profitability” does.237 The court held that an insolvent company 
may, “with due diligence and good faith, pursue[] a business strategy that it believes 
will increase the corporation’s value, but that also involves the incurrence of 
additional debt,” and that in doing so, does not become the guarantor of that 
strategy’s success.238 Furthermore, “[t]hat the strategy results in continued 
insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a cause of 
action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the business 
judgment rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform Delaware 
law.”239 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed “on the basis of and for the reasons 
assigned by the Court of Chancery.”240 
However, this does not mean that defendants may now forget deepening 
insolvency as a relic of the past, or that plaintiffs will abandon the theory.241 First, 
certain courts have held deepening insolvency as a proper damages model for an 
independent tort, such as breach of fiduciary duty.242 The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held, in CitX,243 that deepening insolvency is not a valid damages model 
under Pennsylvania law when the underlying cause of action is malpractice, and 
questioned whether it was a valid model for any cause of action.244 While cases 
 
 234. See, e.g., In re CitX Corp., Inc., 448 F.3d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as a damages model). 
 237. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d, Trenwick 
Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
 238. Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 205. 
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 240. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
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Under Thabault v. Chait, and Harmonizing Brown Schools with Radnor Holdings and Post-CitX Case Law, in 
NORTON INSTS. ON BANKR. L., NORTON ANN. SUR. OF BANKR. L. 123 (2009). 
 242. See, e.g., In re The Brown Schs., 386 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. 
Corp. I, 363 B.R. 324, 338 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2006); In re Global Serv. Grp., LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 458 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 243. In re CitX Corp., Inc., 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 244. Id. at 677. 
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decided soon after CitX interpreted it as barring deepening insolvency as a measure 
of damages for any type of claim,245 the Brown Schools court held that “the Third 
Circuit’s holding in CitX was that the company’s deepening insolvency was not a 
viable theory of damages for the particular claim before that Court, a negligence 
claim for accounting malpractice,” and denied a motion to dismiss because 
plaintiffs in Brown Schools instead alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty.246 
Moreover, the Third Circuit later rejected an appellant accounting firm’s argument 
that the plaintiff’s damages model was impermissible because it referenced the 
deepening of the company’s insolvency.247 The court determined that even though 
the plaintiff had mentioned the phrase “deepening insolvency,” its damages model 
actually was a traditional conception of tort damages.248 Regardless of label, 
[w]hen a plaintiff brings an action for professional negligence and proves 
that the defendant’s negligent conduct was the proximate cause of a 
corporation’s increased liabilities, decreased fair market value, or lost 
profits, the plaintiff may recover damages in accordance with state law.249 
Thus, actual damages proximately caused by wrongdoing are recoverable under a 
traditional theory of damages, even if they are also damages for a company’s 
deepened insolvency.250 
Chait251 confirms, then, that a company’s deepened insolvency can form the basis 
of damages in appropriate circumstances if other factors are also present, but that 
damages cannot be proven simply by pointing to a company’s deepened insolvency, 
i.e., just by demonstrating that a company is more insolvent after the wrongdoing 
than it was before.252 The deepened insolvency does not speak for itself; it must be 
caused by the wrongdoing and proven under a state law cause of action.253 
Even when there is causation, some opinions have declined to employ a 
deepening insolvency measure of damages because, at most, the creditors rather 
than the company itself are damaged by an already insolvent company’s incurrence 
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of additional debt or decline in asset value.254 Such cases posit that because a trustee 
may only assert the company’s claims but not the claims of creditors, damages to 
creditors by deepened insolvency are irrelevant.255 However, other courts have 
acknowledged that the fact that damages that the company would receive inure to 
the benefit of creditors should not change the analysis: “Realistically, a corporation 
is a conduit for its stakeholders, but that does not affect the corporation’s legal 
rights.”256 The law remains unsettled on this point. 
Second, litigants need to continue to be aware of deepening insolvency because 
while Trenwick has proven to be persuasive authority, it is only binding authority 
where Delaware law applies (or in other states that have adopted Trenwick).257 Thus, 
for example, the Third Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a deepening 
insolvency cause of action asserted under Pennsylvania law, holding that the 
complaint indeed stated a claim for deepening insolvency.258 Four judges of the en 
banc court concurred in denying a motion for rehearing.259 However, they 
emphasized in a written opinion that the rejection was solely for procedural reasons 
and that “there is a reason to believe that our prediction in Lafferty about the 
acceptance of deepening insolvency as a cause of action under Pennsylvania law has 
been undermined and ought to be reconsidered.”260 It seems that if deepening 
insolvency charges were leveled at officers and directors, such claims would be 
governed by the internal affairs doctrine, and therefore Delaware law would apply if 
the entity was incorporated in Delaware.261 But where the allegation is made against 
a lender, auditor, or other deep pocket, presumably a Restatement/most significant 
relationship conflicts analysis would be performed, which rarely will result in 
application of Delaware law.262 
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Third, parties should familiarize themselves with deepening insolvency when 
litigating breach of fiduciary duty claims because some courts have dismissed 
breach of fiduciary duty claims on the basis that they are “disguised” deepening 
insolvency charges.263 Other courts have disagreed and held that claims of breach of 
the duty of loyalty, even if they resemble deepening insolvency claims, should not 
be dismissed on that basis.264 But duty of care claims are more likely to be rejected 
on the basis that they are too akin to a discredited deepening insolvency theory: 
Duty of care violations more closely resemble causes of action for deepening 
insolvency because the alleged injury in both is the result of the board of 
directors’ poor business decision. To defeat such an action, a defendant need 
only prove that the process of reaching the final decision was not the result 
of gross negligence. Therefore, claims alleging a due care violation could be 
viewed as a deepening insolvency claim by another name.265 
Thus, deepening insolvency retains its relevance even after cases like Trenwick. 
Conclusion 
As this article shows, the law of fiduciary duties of directors and officers of troubled 
companies and the law of deepening insolvency have undertaken somewhat of a 
metamorphosis over the past decade.266 Some changes were seismic, such as 
Trenwick’s rejection of deepening insolvency, Gheewalla’s rejection of the concept 
of the zone of insolvency and of direct fiduciary duties being owed to creditors, and 
to a lesser extent, Bax’s holding that creditors of an LLC cannot obtain standing to 
pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims.267 Other developments are more subtle, but 
advance significantly an understanding of how Delaware law should be interpreted 
in some fairly typical but not always litigated situations, such as Quadrant’s 
rejection of a theory that the business judgment rule can be rebutted upon a 
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showing that a dominated board took on risk that only benefitted equity that its 
members owned, and Trados’ holding that preferred stockholders are not owed 
special fiduciary duties in addition to the duties owed to common stockholders, 
even if preferred stock is the fulcrum security.268 
All of these cases will now be interpreted by bankruptcy judges across the 
country, because insolvent entities often wind up in bankruptcy court and litigation 
in bankruptcy courts is frequent.269 How bankruptcy courts will apply the learning 
of these cases and plug the gaps of issues not yet raised will be interesting to follow 
over the next cycle of bankruptcy filings. 
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